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1 Introduction
The past fifteen years have seen a remarkable change in the education levels
of recent immigrants in Switzerland (Figure 1). Due to a change in immigra-
tion policy (see Section 2) the share of college graduates among workers who
recently immigrated has nearly tripled, even surpassing the respective share of
natives. At the same time, however, the share of recent immigrants with no
more than mandatory education, while continuously decreasing, is still higher
than the respective share of natives. Thus, recent immigrants in Switzerland
are overrepresented at both the bottom and the top of the education distribu-
tion. More importantly still, as I will show below, this is also reflected in the
fact that immigrants are overrepresented at both tails of the wage distribution
- that is, they compete with both the bottom and top tier of native workers.
In this paper, I assess how this bi-polar immigration has affected the wages of
natives. I go beyond traditional analyses of the wage effects of immigration
firstly by studying the effects along the distribution of wages instead of only
the mean wage effects, secondly by providing estimates for the effects on overall
inequality, and thirdly by contrasting the overall effects with the effects on those
groups of native workers who are most intensely affected by immigration.
Figure 1 about here
Every study that examines the causal effects of immigration on the wages
of natives must find a plausible approximation for the counterfactual. Typi-
cally, this is done by dividing the country of interest into a number of regional
units (e.g. Grossman, 1982; Card, 1990; Altonji and Card, 1991; LaLonde and
Topel, 1991; Hunt, 1992; Card, 2001; Hanson and Slaughter, 2002; Lewis, 2004)
or education-experience groups (e.g. Borjas et al., 1996, 1997; Borjas, 2003;
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). A common feature of all earlier studies is that they
then correlate changes in immigrant shares and mean wages across these cross-
sectional cells.1 In a recent essay, Dustmann et al. (2008b) tread a new path
in the research of the wage effects of immigration. While following a spatial
correlations approach, they assess the effects of immigration along the wage dis-
tribution rather than on mean wages. This procedure is motivated by the notion
that immigration affects workers with different skill (and thus pay) levels very
1This lumping together of the existing literature into two very broad groups does not do
justice to the myriad of innovations introduced by the different authors and the controversial
yet prolific debate about the wage effects of immigration they represent. However, it serves
my limited purpose of contrasting my own research with previous studies. I do not have a bad
conscience in doing so because there are a number of excellent surveys on this literature (e.g.
Dustmann et al., 2008a; Okkerse, 2008) and even a readable newspaper article summarizing
the core of the debate (Lowenstein, 2006).
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differently, and that a focus on mean effects hence is not very insightful.2 They
show that recent immigrants in the UK are overrepresented at the bottom of the
native wage distribution and underrepresented at the top, and that immigration
has consequently decreased wages at the bottom and increased wages at the top
of the wage distribution, while barely affecting the mean.
In my essay, I follow the lead of Dustmann et al. (2008b). However, I divide
the labor force into a number of occupation-experience groups rather than re-
gions since the spatial approach has been criticized by some authors and their
critique is particularly relevant in the case of small-scale Switzerland.3 Further-
more, while Dustmann et al. confine themselves to revealing the wage effects
at different parts of the wage distribution, I follow through by estimating the
effect of immigration on overall inequality. I then put this overall effect into
perspective by comparing it to the magnitude of the effects felt by subgroups of
the labor force - namely those whom immigration most intensely affects.
The case of Switzerland is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, as stated
above, Switzerland attracts not only very poorly educated immigrants, as do
most developed countries, but also a large number of exceptionally well edu-
cated ones. While it is true that some other countries attract highly educated
immigrants as well, these usually experience a significant downgrade upon ar-
rival - that is, they end up competing with natives with a low education level.4In
contrast, as I will show below, many of the highly educated immigrants end up
in highly paid positions in Switzerland and thus compete with the upper tier of
native workers. This rounds off the previous debate about the wage effects of
immigration, which focuses on the effects on low-wage natives; in particular, it
complements the analysis by Dustmann et al. (2008b). Secondly, the analysis
of Switzerland is interesting for “domestic” reasons. The recent change in im-
migration policy (detailed in Section 2), which saw an unprecedented opening
towards immigration from EU and EFTA countries, has given rise to a vigorous
debate about - among others - the wage effects of immigration. The prominence
of this issue in the political debate contrasts with its scarce econometric assess-
ment. There is only one recent econometric study on the effects of immigration
on wages in Switzerland by Gerfin and Kaiser (2010), who follow Borjas (2003)
2While it is true that previous studies have tried to take the heterogeneity of the effects
of immigration on differently skilled natives into account, they have done so by pre-allocating
immigrants and natives to education groups. However, Dustmann et al. show that such an ap-
proach is likely to be misspecified since the labor market values foreign education significantly
less than domestic education (i.e., immigrants experience a “downgrade” upon arrival).
3The critics argue that the effects of immigration dissipate quickly across the whole country,
which disguises the effect of immigration in the spatial correlations approach. This seems likely
in as small a country as Switzerland. The extent to which this is the case in other countries
is highly debated. Most notably, Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001, 2005) find no
evidence for native outmigration. Prominent opposition arises from Borjas et al. (1997) and
Borjas (2003, 2006).
4This is in fact exactly the situation Dustmann et al. (2008b) describe for the UK.
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and estimate mean wage effects based on the elasticities of substitution between
occupation-experience groups.5 Thus, my essay is also aimed at enriching up
the political debate with econometric insights, adding to the analysis of Gerfin
and Kaiser the focus on the wage distribution as sketched above.
The remainder of my essay is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the institutional background and the most important recent trends in
immigration to Switzerland. In Section 3, I present the empirical framework of
my analysis. Section 4 provides a short discussion of data source and definitions.
The main results of my analysis are presented in Section 5. I assess the extent
of the wage effects of immigration on overall inequality in Switzerland as well
as on subgroups of the labor force in Section 6 . The final section concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In 1991, the Swiss Federal Council outlined the cornerstones of a new immi-
gration policy: immigration from EU and EFTA countries should be gradually
liberated from any constraints, immigration from developed countries outside
the EU and EFTA - mainly the United States, Canada, and Australia - should
be restricted to highly skilled workers, and immigration from other countries
entirely stopped except for in a few exceptional cases.6 This policy was then
gradually implemented into the issuance of residency permits and perpetuated
with the signing of the “Agreement on the free movement of persons” (FMP)
between Switzerland and the EU, enacted in June 2002. While the FMP was
originally concluded between Switzerland and the fifteen member states of the
EU as of 1999 (EU-15), it was subsequently extended to the new member states.
Immigration was initially limited by yearly quotas; these were gradually in-
creased and finally abandoned (for the EU-15) in June 2007.7 Additionally, in
order to prevent a deterioration of the labor conditions for low earners due to
increased competition by immigrants, Swiss policymakers passed a package of
supportive measures [“Flankierende Massnahmen”]. Within the frame of these
measures, independent commissions monitor the adherence to collective labor
agreements and to the customary labor conditions.
The reorganization of the Swiss immigration policy in the early 1990s led
to a significant change in the composition of immigrant inflows. Immigration
from EU and EFTA countries has dramatically increased both in relative and in
5As opposed to the scarce econometric literature, there are an ample number of descriptive
analyses. The most notable of these studies are Avenir Suisse and Müller-Jentsch, eds (2008),
a multi-faceted overview over the consequences of recent immigration by the think tank Avenir
Suisse, and SECO (2010), the latest version of an annual report by the Swiss State Secretariat
for Economic Affairs (SECO).
6Bundesblatt, Vol. 3, 1991, p. 291-303.
7See SECO (2010) for the extent of the quotas as well as exhaustion rates.
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absolute terms. As already discussed, this shift in the origin of immigrants goes
hand in hand with an increase in their educational levels (Figure 1). As discussed
below, this is also reflected in an increasing share of immigrants active in high
skill jobs, which implies increased competition at the upper end of the wage
distribution. All of these changes were of a gradual rather than a discontinuous
nature since the revision of immigration policy was not designed as a sudden
rupture, but as a continuous evolution.
3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Comparison of Occupation-Experience Groups
The core of every study on the wage effects of immigration lies in finding a
plausible approximation for the counterfactual (the wage changes that would
have occurred in the absence of immigration), which is unobserved. Usually, this
is achieved by dividing the labor force into a number of subgroups across which
differences in immigration can be correlated with differences in wage changes.
An approximation of this sort is associated with two potential problems. Firstly,
if there are no barriers to a relocation of workers from one group to another,
the effects of immigration to one group may be dispersed across the whole labor
market. Secondly, if the allocation of immigrants to groups is not exogenous to
labor market outcomes, the correlation between immigration and wage changes
does not reflect the causal effect of immigration on wages.
Dustmann et al. (2008b), whose approach I adapt to the case of Switzer-
land, follow the mainstream of the immigration literature and approximate the
counterfactual by comparing regional labor markets. In this setup, it is likely
that the distribution of immigrants across cross-sectional cells is endogenous.
In particular, most immigrants settle in regions where they have found or ex-
pect to find a good job, and the regional distribution of immigrants is thus
highly correlated with both current and future labor market outcomes. This
is widely accepted in the literature and partly accounted for by the use of IV
approaches (e.g. Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001) or the analysis of natural
experiments (e.g. Card, 1990). A second problem arises from the inter-regional
mobility of workers. If workers find that immigration deteriorates their labor
market prospects in the current region of residence, they could move or com-
mute to another region, and consequently, the effects of immigration would not
remain localized to the region experiencing the inflow of immigrants. It is heav-
ily disputed whether the workers’ mobility is large enough to pose a problem
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for the spatial approach.8 However, one can make a strong argument that it
indeed poses a problem in the case of small-scale Switzerland.9
Since the spatial approach is thus inappropriate for an analysis of the Swiss
labor market, I deviate from the procedure developed by Dustmann et al. and
compare outcomes across occupation-experience groups (see Friedberg, 2001 for
a similar approach).10 Since job applicants are usually required to dispose of a
certain amount of working experience in the relevant field, workers are virtually
immobile with respect to occupation-experience groups. Hence, a dispersion of
the effects of an immigrant inflow across all cross-sectional cells is a minor issue
in this approach. The problem of endogeneity, however, still exists. If domestic
labor supply in an occupation group falls short of labor demand, wages tend
to rise and employment prospects are bright, which attracts immigrants and
encourages employers to search for workers abroad. Thus, immigrant density
is positively correlated with labor market outcomes, and an OLS regression
that seeks to find the causal effect of immigration on wages is thus subject to
an upward bias - that is, it delivers too optimistic a picture of the effects of
immigration. The OLS coefficients obtained in my analysis therefore have to be
interpreted as upper bounds for the true effects of immigration. I address this
issue with an IV approach that is outlined in Section 3.3.
3.2 Changes along the Distribution of Wages
The theoretical motivation for my empirical approach is derived from the sim-
ple model outlined by Dustmann et al. (2008b).11 Specifically, they model an
economy that produces one output good using capital and a labor aggregate
composed of a number of differential skill groups. If capital supply is perfectly
elastic, an increase in immigrant density in this economy has no effect on wages
if immigrants are distributed across skill groups in the same proportions as na-
tives (because relative factor supply remains unaffected). If the distribution of
immigrants across skill groups differs from that of natives, an increase in immi-
8Most notably, Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) find no evidence for native
outmigration. Prominent opposition arises from Borjas (2003).
9An examination of transport travel times between the five largest cities in Switzerland is
illustrative. From Zurich, the eastern-most of these cities, Basel and Berne are accessible by
train within less than one hour, Lausanne in only slightly more than two hours, and Geneva
in less than three hours.
10Specifically, I use the 23 occupation categories provided by the LSE (see table 1) and
form three age groups (18-34, 35-49, and 50-65) as a proxy for experience. See Section 4 for
more details. Some studies divide the labor force into skill groups in terms of education and
experience (e.g. Borjas, 2003; Gerfin and Kaiser, 2010) rather than regions or occupation
groups, but this procedure has been criticized since education is a very rough measure for the
relevant labor market skills. Immigrants and natives disposing of the same level of education
may thus compete for very different jobs (see e.g. Dustmann et al., 2008b).
11Since this model is elaborated in detail in their paper, I am content with intuitively
discussing its main implications.
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grant density increases the wages of those skill groups in which immigrants are
underrepresented (because they become more scarce) and decreases the wages
of those skill groups in which immigrants are overrepresented (because they be-
come more abundant). In the case of imperfect capital supply, the effects are
overall more negative but those skill groups in which immigrants are relatively
more frequent still lose relatively more. This simple theoretical model hence
provides a formalization of the notion that immigration deteriorates the labor
market outcomes of “similar” natives and improves the outcomes of “dissimilar”
natives.
In my empirical approach, the unit of observation (the “economy” in terms
of the theoretical model) is an occupation-experience group. The skill dis-
tribution in this group is represented by the wage distribution. That is, if
immigrant density in an occupation-experience group increases, I expect that
wages will decrease at those parts of the wage distribution where immigrants
are overrepresented and increase at those parts where immigrants are under-
represented. These changes are identified by comparing different occupation-
experience groups (“economies”) with different extents of immigration.12
This reasoning suggests a two-stage procedure for the analysis. In the first
step, which is of merely descriptive nature, I determine the position of immi-
grants in the resident wage distribution. This is needed to derive predictions as
to which wage percentiles are adversely affected by immigration (the percentiles
where immigrants are overrepresented) and which are favorably affected (the
percentiles where immigrants are underrepresented). The second step comprises
the regression analysis, which reveals how the wage percentiles are actually af-
fected and thus tests the hypotheses derived in the first step.13
For the regression equation of step two, the theoretical model outlined above
implies a linear relationship between the log of wage percentiles in an occupation-
experience group and immigrant density in the group. I therefore estimate the
12This is best illustrated with a specific example. Consider the occupation group of con-
struction workers. Construction workers are very heterogeneous with respect to their skills,
which is reflected in their wages. We find unqualified laborers performing basic tasks on the
building site at the bottom of the wage distribution of construction workers, and specialized
workers who lead and instruct the laborers at the top of the distribution. Suppose that im-
migrants in the construction sector are predominantly low skilled. If there is an inflow of
foreign construction workers, this will increase competition for laborers on the one hand and
increase demand for team leaders on the other. As a result, wages at the bottom of the wage
distribution decrease while wages at the top increase. To be able to identify these wage effects,
I compare the changes in the wage distribution of construction workers to those in the wage
distribution of workers in other occupations (e.g. retail sale), which do not experience an
immigrant inflow.
13The two steps of my analysis are technically unrelated: the first step is only used to
obtain predictions on the outcome of the second step and does not affect the specification of
the regression equations. Due to this unrelatedness and the specificity of the hypotheses tested
in the second step, a confirmation of these hypotheses provides strong empirical evidence that
the underlying framework accurately describes the economic mechanisms at work.
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model
logwpit = αpi + βpt + γpmit + δpXit + pit, (1)
where wpit denotes the pth wage percentile of residents in occupation-experience
group i in period t, αpi denotes a group fixed effect, βpt denotes a time fixed
effect, mit denotes the share of immigrants in group i at time t, and Xit is a
vector of observable socioeconomic characteristics of group i in period t.14 To
control for group-specific effects, I analyze a number of cross-sections observed
at different points in time and calculate first differences.15 Hence, the regression
equation takes the form
(logwpit − logwpit−1) = (βpt − βpt−1) + γp (mit −mit−1)
+δp (Xit −Xit−1) + (pit − pit−1) . (2)
The change in the time fixed effect captures the influence of the business cycle
and the inclusion of the change in vector Xi allows us to control for changes in
the composition of the labor force in an occupation-experience group that affect
wages.
I estimate equation (2) for every fifth wage percentile since I want to ex-
amine how a change in overall immigrant density affects each percentile. The
parameters of interest in these regressions are the coefficients γp. The theoretical
framework outlined above suggests a very specific pattern of these coefficients:
they are predicted to be negative for those percentiles where immigrant density
is above average and positive for those percentiles where immigrant density is
below average.
The position of immigrants in the native wage distribution has to be sim-
ilar in all units of observation in order for the regressions to yield meaningful
coefficients. To see this, consider a simple example. If immigrants were over-
represented at the bottom of the wage distribution in one half of the occupation
groups and at the top in the other half, we would expect the bottom percentiles
to be adversely affected in the first half and favorably affected in the latter. The
average effect - and thus the regression coefficient - would be close to zero and
14The wage percentiles are defined such that p percent of the resident workers in group i
at time t earn a wage below or equal to wpit. The socioeconomic characteristics I control for
are average age, ratio of workers with high to low education levels, ratio of medium to low
education levels, share of earlier immigrants, and share of border commuters in an occupation-
experience group. However, robustness checks show that the choice of controls is not critical
for my results.
15Specifically, the data of the LSE, which are used for the regression analysis, are available
for every other year from 1994 to 2008. In my baseline setup, I use all of these surveys - that
is, I analyze changes over two-year-periods. As a robustness check, I calculate changes from
1994 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2008, which reduces the number of cross-sections to two. See
Section 4 for details on the data and Section 5.2 for details on the exact specification of the
regressions.
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meaningless due to the heterogeneity in the effects. Section 5.1 shows that the
position of immigrants in the native wage distribution fundamentally differs be-
tween high and low skill occupations but is roughly similar within each of these
two categories. I am thus able to test my hypotheses by running the percentile
regressions separately for low and high skill occupations.
In my analysis, I distinguish between two groups of residents, which may be
differently affected by immigration: natives and earlier immigrants.16 Differ-
ences between natives and earlier immigrants may arise for two reasons. Firstly,
differences in the skill composition between the two groups could imply a dif-
ferent location of immigrants in the two wage distributions and thus suggest
differential effects of immigration on the distributions. Secondly, the substi-
tutability between recent immigrants and these two groups might differ due to
differences in unobserved characteristics.
3.3 Dealing with Endogeneity
The coefficients obtained in an OLS estimation of equation (2) suffer from an
upward bias due to the endogeneity of the share of recent immigrants.17 While
the use of an IV approach along the lines of Card (2001) has become the state
of the art in the spatial analysis of the effects of immigration, researchers who
follow an occupation or skill group approach either only report OLS coefficients
or employ the lag of the immigrant share as an IV without substantiating the
validity of this procedure.18
The IV approaches used in spatial analyses are based on the finding by
Bartel (1989) that newly arriving immigrants seek connection to a network of
compatriots and thus tend to settle in regions where they find a large number
of fellow countrymen. If the settlement pattern of earlier immigrants is uncor-
related with the subsequent development of local labor markets, this behavior
leads to variation in immigrant density across regions which is exogenous to
local labor market conditions and can thus be used to identify the causal ef-
fect of immigration on the wages of residents. Altonji and Card (1991) were
the first to make use of this finding and employ the regional distribution of
immigrants in a base year as an IV for changes in immigrant density. Card
(2001) refined this procedure by distributing the immigrants arriving in a par-
ticular year across region-occupation groups according to the nationality-specific
16For a definition of these groups see Section 4.
17Put formally, the change in immigration, (mit −mit−1), is positively correlated with the
error term, (pit − pit−1).
18To the best of my knowledge, the only exception to this is Friedberg (2001), who uses
the occupation of immigrants in their home country as an IV for their occupation in the new
country of residence. Her approach, however, hinges upon the unique circumstances of the
natural experiment she assesses and can thus not generally be employed.
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settlement patterns in a base year. I argue that a very similar approach to ad-
dress the endogeneity in the share of recent immigrants can be employed in
an occupation-experience group analysis. Specifically, I distribute immigrants
arriving in a particular year across occupation-experience groups according to
the occupational distribution of foreigners in 1994.19
This IV for the change in the share of recent immigrants must meet three
criteria: (i) it must be correlated with the change in the share of recent immi-
grants (the endogenous regressor); (ii) it must not have any direct effects on
wage changes (the dependent variable); (iii) it must be exogenous, that is, un-
correlated with labor demand shocks affecting wages. The adherence to criterion
(i) can both be established intuitively and tested empirically. As for intuition, a
rich sociological and economic literature has stressed the importance of informal
networks in job search.20 One strand of the literature on this topic has shown
that ethnicity is an important characteristic determining these networks, and
that the probability of a worker being hired by a firm thus increases in the share
of workers from the same ethnic group already employed (e.g., Patel and Vella,
2007; Dustmann et al., 2010). Newly arriving immigrants are therefore likely
to start pursuing a profession that a large number of earlier immigrants from
the same source country pursue. Hence, the occupational distribution of the
established immigrant population can be used to predict changes in the share
of immigrants. This claim is thoroughly tested in the first stage regressions, the
results of which are revealed in Section 5.3.
The adherence to criteria (ii) and (iii) cannot be tested empirically, but must
be substantiated solely on argumentative grounds. Criterion (ii) is likely to be
met, since there is no obvious reason why the share of foreigners in an occupation
as of 1994 should affect changes in the wage distribution in subsequent years.
Fulfillment of criterion (iii) is more questionable. The distribution of immigrants
in 1994 is correlated with contemporaneous labor market shocks, and if these
persist over time, the IV is correlated with the error term. If the first stage is
only weak, the resulting bias in the IV estimator may even exceed the bias in
the OLS estimator. My IV results should thus be interpreted cautiously.
19Three remarks are in order. Firstly, one would prefer a base year that lies further in
the past. However, the classification of occupations is specific to the LSE, and I therefore
have to calculate the occupational distribution based on the earliest available wave of the
LSE. Secondly and unfortunately, the LSE does not report the nationality of workers. Hence,
instead of distributing immigrants across occupations according to the nationality-specific
occupational distribution in 1994 I have to use the occupational distribution of all foreigners.
And thirdly, since I run my regressions separately for high and for low skill occupations,
I construct my instrumental variable separately for these two groups; that is, I distribute
high (low) skill immigrants across high (low) skill occupations according to the occupational
distribution of foreigners in high (low) skill occupations.
20For an encompassing overview see Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004).
10
4 Data, Sample, and Definitions
The data used for my core analysis stem from the Swiss Earnings Structure Sur-
vey (LSE), conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office [Schweizerisches
Bundesamt für Statistik, BFS], and cover all even years from 1994 to 2008
(which are all years the LSE is currently available for). Compared to the Swiss
Labour Force Survey [Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung, SAKE], the main
data source for most previous studies (e.g. Küng, 2005; Gerfin and Kaiser, 2010),
the LSE features two advantages. Firstly, the sample size is much larger, which
is particularly critical for the calculation of immigrant shares in a sample that is
divided into a large number of cross-sectional cells. Secondly, the categorization
of occupations is very appropriate for dividing the sample into cross-sectional
cells, and a variable reporting the skill requirements for the tasks of each worker
allows for an easy assessment of the skill dimension. I exclude workers below 18
or above 65 years of age as well as those employed in the public sector from the
sample.21
Natives, earlier immigrants, and recent immigrants. The basic aim of my
analysis is to reveal how the inflow of workers from abroad affects the wages of
Swiss natives and earlier immigrants. The LSE allows a rough identification of
these three population groups based on citizenship and residency permit. The
level of immigration is defined as the change in the labor force share of “recent
immigrants”, that is, foreign citizens with an annual residency permit (B permit)
or a short term residency permit (L permit).22 Swiss citizens are regarded as
“natives”, and foreigners with a permanent residency permit (C permit) form
the group of “earlier immigrants”.23
Skill requirements. The skill requirements of a position are codified in a
categorical variable of the LSE which I use to classify occupation groups as
either “high skill” (high share of workers performing high skill tasks) or “low
skill” (low share of workers performing high skill tasks). The skill requirements
21The exclusion of individuals employed in the public administration is motivated by two ob-
servations. Firstly, wages in the public sector are defined and hence likely to be less responsive
to labor supply shocks than wages in the private sector. Secondly, the effect of immigration
in the public sector is lower simply because recent immigrants are much less likely to work in
the public administration than in the private sector (the overall share of recent immigrants
in the public sector amounts to 3.2, the share in the private sector to 7 percent). Robustness
checks (the results of which are not included in this essay) show that my results are not driven
by the exclusion of employees in the public administration.
22Generally, an L permit is issued for foreigners staying in Switzerland for less than a year
and a B permit is issued for foreigners staying for longer. According to the SAKE data, which
provide information on both the residency permit and the duration of residence, the average
residence duration is roughly 5.5 years for holders of a B or L permit who are employed and
between 18 and 65 years of age.
23Foreigners are in a position to be granted a C permit at the earliest after five years’ regular
and uninterrupted residence in Switzerland. The SAKE data show that the average residence
duration is 21.2 years for holders of a C permit who are employed and between 18 and 65
years of age.
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of a job are categorized in four levels, (i) position that requires a worker to
perform highly demanding and most difficult tasks, (ii) position that requires
qualified and autonomous work, (iii) position that requires some professional
knowledge, (iv) position that features simple and repetitive activities. To easily
assess the skill dimension, I define skill levels (i) and (ii) as “high skill tasks”
and levels (iii) and (iv) as “low skill tasks”.
Occupation-experience groups. I form occupation-experience groups using a
worker’s actual occupation and his age as a proxy for labor market experience.
In terms of age I form three groups of workers: 18-34, 35-49, and 50-65 years.
Occupation is categorized based on a list of 23 occupation categories codified in
a variable of the LSE. Table 1 characterizes these occupation groups. The table
entries are ordered by the share of workers performing “high skill tasks”, which
- unsurprisingly - is roughly in line with the share of workers with a high level
of education and the average real wage earned. For the subsequent analysis,
I divide occupations into “high skill occupations” and “low skill occupations”
based on this ranking. I draw the line between these two groups after position
8 since there is a drop-off in terms of the share of high skill tasks thereafter,
but the exact cut-off is not critical to the results of my analysis. According to
this definition, about one quarter of the labor force is employed in high skill
occupations and about three quarters are employed in low skill occupations. A
distinction between these two categories is necessary since the position of recent
immigrants in the resident wage distribution varies greatly between them, which
implies differential wage effects.24
Table 1 about here
Wages. I calculate the gross hourly wage including bonuses and special
payments obtained over the course of the year. It is measured in real Swiss
Francs (CHF).25
5 Main Results
5.1 Position of Recent Immigrants in the Wage Distribu-
tion of Residents
The theoretical model outlined above predicts that immigration decreases wages
at those parts of the wage distribution where immigrants are overrepresented
and increases wages where they are underrepresented. I thus have to assess
24See Section 5.1 for the differences in the distribution of immigrants.
25Wages are deflated using the consumer price index constructed by the BFS; the base year
is 2000.
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the position of recent immigrants in the wage distribution of resident workers
in order to obtain hypotheses for my regression analysis. It is important to
remember that I am only able to obtain unambiguous hypotheses if the position
of recent immigrants in the resident wage distribution is roughly the same in all
analyzed occupation groups.26
An analysis of the position of recent immigrants in the wage distribution of
natives and earlier immigrants reveals striking differences between two broad
categories of occupations. While recent immigrants are overrepresented at the
bottom of the wage distribution of natives and earlier immigrants in all low skill
occupations, they are overrepresented at the top in all high skill occupations.27
This means that Switzerland on the one hand attracts workers fulfilling the
most basic tasks in low skill occupations and on the other hand exceptionally
skilled professionals active in high skill occupations. Hence, the requirement
that the relative wage distribution of recent immigrants be similar in every
single occupation is fulfilled if we run regressions separately for high and for low
skill occupations.
Figure 2 illustrates these findings in condensed form. Panels (a) and (b)
show the position of recent immigrants in the wage distribution of natives and
earlier immigrants, respectively, in high skill occupations, and Panels (c) and
(d) the position of recent immigrants in the wage distribution of natives and
earlier immigrants, respectively, in low skill occupations. In the left column,
that is, Panels (a) and (c), the abscissa indicates the native wage percentile
and the ordinate measures probability density. The dashed line illustrates the
probability density function of natives. Since 1 percent of natives are located
in each native wage percentile, the distribution of natives is horizontal at the
level 0.01. The solid line depicts the Kernel density estimates for the probability
density function of recent immigrants.28 The density of recent immigrants is
above average where the solid line is above 0.01 (indicating that more than 1
percent of recent immigrants are located in those wage percentiles). The abscissa
in the right column, that is, Panels (b) and (d), indicates the wage percentiles
of earlier immigrants and the dashed line the probability density function of
earlier immigrants instead of natives, but they are otherwise identical to panels
on the left.
Figure 2 about here
Panel (a) shows that in high skill occupations recent immigrants are un-
26See Section 3.2 for a detailed explanation.
27See Section 4 for the classification of occupations into these two categories.
28I use the Gaussian function and STATA automatically calculates the Kernel bandwidth
using a rule of thumb.
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derrepresented below the 60th percentile, slightly overrepresented between the
60th and the 80th percentile, and starkly overrepresented above this level. In
contrast, recent immigrants are heavily overrepresented in the bottom 15 per-
centiles in low skill occupations, slightly overrepresented from the 15th to the
40th percentiles, and underrepresented above as is revealed in Panel (c). Panels
(b) and (d) show that the position of recent immigrants in the wage distribution
of earlier immigrants is nearly the same as in the wage distribution of natives.
Based on these findings, I expect immigration to high skill occupations to
benefit the bottom wage percentiles of natives and earlier immigrants and exert
pressure on the top percentiles. Conversely, I expect immigration to decrease
the bottom and increase the top wage percentiles in low skill occupations. Since
the position of recent immigrants in the wage distribution of natives and earlier
immigrants is roughly identical, I expect no significant differences in the effect
of immigration on wages of natives and earlier immigrants - unless there are
significant differences in unobserved characteristics.
5.2 OLS Estimates
The findings of the preceding section suggest an analysis of the effects of im-
migration on the wages of four subgroups of the resident population: natives
in high skill occupations, natives in low skill occupations, earlier immigrants in
high skill occupations, and earlier immigrants in low skill occupations. I observe
a random sample of workers in all even years from 1994 to 2008 in each of these
subgroups. I divide all of these samples into occupation-experience groups and
calculate the biannual changes in a number of group characteristics to obtain
the variables for my regression analysis.
I run a separate regression for every fifth wage percentile to assess the effect
of immigration on each percentile. The dependent variable is the biannual
change in the respective percentile. I regress these percentile changes on the
changes in the share of recent immigrants as well as on control variables for
changes in the composition of the labor force (average age, ratio of high to low
levels of education, ratio of medium to low levels of education, share of earlier
immigrants, and share of cross-border commuters).29 Since wages are unlikely
to respond to immigration and changes in the composition of the labor force
immediately, I use the lagged rather than the contemporaneous changes in these
variables as regressors.30 Additionally, I include dummy variables to control for
time fixed effects. Occupation-experience groups are weighted with their sample
29These regressors are the same in every percentile-regression as they are occupation-
experience group-specific.
30This conflicts with the use of the time index in 2. However, I use the contemporaneous
change in immigrant density in a robustness check.
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sizes. The results of this baseline setup are illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 about here
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 3 depict the results for natives and earlier im-
migrants, respectively, in high skill occupations, and Panels (c) and (d) the
results for low skill occupations. The abscissa indicates the percentile and the
ordinate measures the size of the coefficient. Since I measure the dependent
variable in logs and the independent variable in percentage points, a coefficient
of 0.01 signifies that an increase in the share of recent immigrants by 1 percent-
age point leads to a wage increase of about 1 percent. The dashed lines mark
the range of the 90 percent confidence interval. Standard errors are robust and
clustered on the level of occupation-experience groups in order to account for
serial correlation. The patterns for natives and earlier immigrants are very sim-
ilar. The coefficients for high skill occupations form a downward sloping curve
that reaches from 0.015 (natives) and 0.026 (earlier immigrants) to −0.006 and
−0.017, respectively. This is in-line with the prediction of positive coefficients at
the bottom and negative coefficients at the top of the wage distribution, which I
derived in Section 5.1 based on the position of recent immigrants in the resident
wage distribution. While the coefficients at the tails of the distribution are of
considerable magnitude, only those at the bottom are statistically significant.
However, while the coefficients at the top are not significantly different from
zero, they are significantly different from those at the bottom. That is, while
there is no clear-cut evidence for negative wage effects of immigration on the
top percentiles, there is evidence that they are more negatively affected than
the bottom percentiles. The magnitude of the coefficients is significantly larger
in the case of earlier immigrants, which implies that the wages of earlier im-
migrants are more sensitive to immigration than those of natives. The most
interesting finding is that the effects along the distribution of wages vary sub-
stantially, which leads to average effects close to zero. This emphasizes the fact
that the focus of most previous studies on mean wage effects blocks the view on
distributional effects of immigration.31
31I check the robustness of all of these findings in a number of changes to the setup of the
percentile regressions. The results are illustrated in table A.1. Column (1) shows the results
of regressions that include no control variables and no weights. Column (2) shows the results
of regressions including time fixed effects and population controls as in the baseline setup
but again no weights. Column (3) presents the results of the baseline setup discussed in the
preceding paragraph. In the regressions of column (4), I use a different method to account
for the lagged reaction of wages to immigration and changes in the labor force. Specifically,
I calculate first differences in all variables from 1994 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2008 instead
of calculating them biannually, since it is likely that these time spans are long enough for
wage adjustments to take place. These tables also indicate the effects of immigration on mean
wages, which is what previous studies usually report. All of these robustness checks confirm
the previous findings.
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The pattern of the coefficients for low skill occupations seems less sensible.
The coefficients are positive at all parts of the wage distribution and of mi-
nor magnitude; the confidence intervals are very slim, which suggests a precise
estimation. This conflicts with the findings of the preceding section, which sug-
gest negative coefficients at the bottom and positive coefficients at the top of
the wage distribution. A possible explanation for these puzzling results is that
there is little room for downward adjustment of wages in low skill occupations.
Firstly, universally binding collective labor agreements govern labor conditions
in many low skill occupations, and these agreements usually include a mini-
mum wage.32 Secondly, the Swiss authorities have taken explicit measures to
prevent wage decreases in low skill occupations as a consequence of the FMP
[Flankierende Massnahmen] as outlined in Section 2. The absence of evidence
for negative wage effects in low skill occupations, which is in-line with the re-
sults of Gerfin and Kaiser (2010), is remarkable. It not only conflicts with the
common perception of the consequences of immigration but also seems to invali-
date a key argument of the adversaries of the liberalization of Swiss immigration
policy. However, this does not imply that immigration fails to affect workers in
low skill occupations adversely, because there might well be employment rather
than wage effects.33
5.3 IV Estimates
The OLS estimates presented in the preceding section have to be interpreted as
upper bounds for the true effects of immigration, since the likely endogeneity in
the share of recent immigrants gives rise to an upward bias. I present the results
of an IV approach in this section that is designed to mitigate the problem of
endogeneity. Specifically, I use the change in the share of recent immigrants
predicted based on the occupational distribution of foreigners in 1994 to instru-
ment the actual change.34 I use two stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the
IV coefficients.
The first stage results of my IV approach reveal that my IV can indeed
explain a part of the variation in the endogenous regressor but not enough to
32Universally binding collective labor agreements [allgemeinverbindliche Gesam-
tarbeitsverträge] for individual occupations (e.g. construction workers, hair
dressers, or carpenters) instead of a global minimum wage are a particular-
ity of the Swiss labor market. For a full list of all current agreements see
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00385/00420/00430/index.html.
33I complete the same robustness checks as for high skill occupations. The results are
illustrated in Table A.2. The pattern of coefficients is rather sensitive to changes in the
regression setup, but the coefficients are all close to zero. While it thus remains unclear
how exactly immigration affects wages in low skill occupations, the absence of any persistent
negative pattern suggests that there are not very large adverse wage effects.
34For details on the construction of the IV see Section 3.3.
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rule out the problems associated with weak instruments.35 The coefficient of
the IV is positive and statistically significant in all but one specification, but
the first stage is rather sensitive to changes in the regression setup and the
F statistic is lower than ten in some of the setups.36 A major reason for the
partially weak first stage probably results because nationality is unobserved in
my data, and I therefore can only roughly capture the network effects in the
occupational choices of newly arriving immigrants. Furthermore, I explain in
Section 2 that the FMP has significantly altered the structure of immigration
to Switzerland. Thus, a prediction of the occupational choices of immigrants
arriving under the new regime based on the choices of immigrants who have
arrived under the old regime is likely to be flawed. The results of the second
stage must therefore be interpreted cautiously since the bias in the IV estimator
may even exceed the bias in the OLS estimator in the case of weak instruments.
The results of the second stage for my preferred specification (biannual
changes, time-fixed effects, population controls, and weights) are illustrated
in Figure 4. Panels (a) and (b) show the results for natives and earlier immi-
grants, respectively, in high skill occupations. Contrary to intuition, using an
IV approach does not shift the curve of coefficients down but rather rotates it
clockwise so that coefficients at the bottom are more positive and coefficients at
the top more negative. The downward slope of the curve, which is in-line with
the theoretical model, remains intact, which strengthens the evidence found in
the preceding section. Standard errors are significantly larger than in the OLS
regressions, however, which casts some doubt on the validity of the point esti-
mates. The results for natives and earlier immigrants in low skill occupations
are depicted in Panels (c) and (d), respectively. Again, the IV coefficients are
overall not substantially lower than the OLS coefficients. As is the case with
the OLS coefficients, the IV coefficients do not form an upward sloped curve as
the theoretical model predicts. Again, the confidence intervals are wider than
in the OLS regressions.37
Figure 4 about here
In sum, the IV estimation backs up the findings of the preceding section. The
coefficients for high skill occupations are positive at the bottom and negative at
the top of the wage distribution, while the coefficients for low skill occupations
35See Table A.3.
36The econometric literature established the rule of thumb that F has to be larger than ten
in order to detect weak instruments (e.g., Bound et al., 1995 or Staiger and Stock, 1997).
37I complete the same robustness checks as for the OLS regressions. The results are illus-
trated in Table A.4 for natives and earlier immigrants in high skill occupations and in Table
A.5 for natives and earlier immigrants in low skill occupations. It turns out that the IV esti-
mates for high skill occupations are robust, while the estimates for low skill occupations are
again rather sensitive to changes in the regression setup but always close to zero.
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are close to zero. There is no evidence for a substantial upward bias in the OLS
coefficients, but I cannot entirely rule out this possibility due to the imprecise
estimation. Since the results of the IV estimation do not substantially differ
from those of the OLS estimation while confidence intervals are much wider, I
prefer my OLS results.
6 A Counterfactual Exercise: How Large Is the
Impact of Recent Immigration on Wages in
Switzerland?
The regression analysis in the previous sections revealed the marginal effects of
an increase in the share of recent immigrants on the wages of natives and earlier
immigrants. In this section, I outline the overall magnitude of the wage effects
of immigration to Switzerland during the past decade and a half. I in turn focus
on the effects of immigration on the overall wage distribution and the extent
of the effects for those population groups, which are most strongly affected by
immigration.
6.1 Overall Effect on Inequality
Immigration to Switzerland has had two effects on the wage distribution, which
I will term the “wage change effect” and the “accounting effect”. I indicate the
changes in the wage distribution of natives and earlier immigrants caused by
the labor supply shock of immigration with “wage change effect”, and I refer
to the change in the wage distribution of the whole population caused by the
inclusion of the recent immigrants with the “accounting effect”. In other words,
the wage change effect results from competition and complementarity of recent
immigrant with workers already living in Switzerland, and the accounting effect
results from the addition of the recent immigrants to the labor force. The wage
change effect for high skill occupations implies a reduction in inequality since
wages decreased at the top and increased at the bottom of the wage distribu-
tion. To calculate the extent of this effect, I construct a counterfactual wage
distribution for natives and earlier immigrants, that is, I subtract the estimated
wage effects of immigration from the actual wages. To calculate the estimated
wage effects, I multiply the coefficients obtained in my preferred OLS regressions
(see columns (3) for natives and earlier immigrants in Table A.1) by the change
in immigrant density from 1994 to 2008 in each occupation group (see Table
A.6). The difference between the actual and the counterfactual wage distribu-
tions of natives and earlier immigrants represents the wage change effect. My
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analysis does not provide evidence for any significant wage effects for low skill
occupations; furthermore the overall share of recent immigrants has remained
roughly constant (see Figure 1). I thus assume that the wage change effect
for low skill occupations is close to zero. The accounting effect of immigration
implies an increase in inequality, since immigrants are overrepresented at the
bottom of the wage distribution in low skill occupations and at the top in high
skill occupations. In sum, the wage change effect implies a decrease in overall
inequality and the accounting effect implies an increase in inequality, so that
the total effect is a priori unclear.
An assessment of the three Lorenz curves drawn in Panel (a) of Figure 5
shows which effect dominates. The Lorenz curve drawn in light grey represents
the counterfactual for natives and earlier immigrants - that is, the wage distri-
bution I would expect to observe in the absence of immigration. The actual
Lorenz curve for natives and earlier immigrants is drawn in dark grey. It lies
above the counterfactual curve since the wage change effect implies a reduction
in inequality. The Lorenz curve for total population is drawn in black. It lies
below the counterfactual curve, which implies that the accounting effect domi-
nates the wage change effect and overall inequality is higher with immigration
than it would be without. Since the differences between the three Lorenz curves
are almost imperceptible, Panel (b) illustrates the difference between the ac-
tual and the counterfactual curve for natives and earlier immigrants (the wage
change effect) and the difference between the curve for total population and
the counterfactual curve (the total effect).38 The Gini coefficients for the total
population, natives and earlier immigrants, and the counterfactual for natives
and earlier immigrants are 0.263, 0.256, and 0.259, respectively. That means
that the wage change effect amounts to -0.003, the accounting effect to 0.007,
and the total effect to 0.004 in terms of the Gini coefficient.
Figure 5 about here
This analysis hence yields two insights: (i) even though recent immigration
to Switzerland has reduced inequality among residents (wage change effect), it
is likely that total inequality has increased due to the immigrants themselves
(accounting effect); (ii) both the wage change and the accounting effect are of
minor magnitude from an aggregate perspective, which implies that immigration
plays a minor part in the determination of overall wage inequality in Switzer-
land. There are two important caveats, however. Firstly, the wage change effect
is calculated based on the point estimates of my regressions and therefore sub-
38Reading example: The total effect at 10 percent of the population is about 0.0006. This
implies that the poorest 10 percent of the population dispose of 0.06 percent less of total
income than in a hypothetical world without immigration.
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ject to some degree of imprecision. And secondly, my whole analysis is restricted
to the effects of immigration on gross hourly wage rates. It thus neglects ef-
fects of immigration on employment opportunities of residents, on taxes and
social security, and on costs of living, which also play important parts in the
determination of effective inequality.
6.2 Effects for Subgroups
While the effects of immigration seem negligible from an aggregate perspective,
they may be of considerable magnitude for subgroups of the population. The
sign and magnitude of the expected wage effect for a worker depends on his po-
sition in the wage distribution and the extent of immigration to his occupation
group. The increase in the share of recent immigrants in high skill occupations
has been largest in the occupation group “research and development” (7.5 per-
centage points from 1994 to 2008; see Table A.6), which implies that the workers
in this group are likely to have experienced the largest wage effects. Within the
occupation group, the effects are largest for workers at the tails of the wage
distribution. Thus, an analysis of the wage effects for the 5th and 95th wage
percentile in research and development delivers a picture of the boundaries of
the wage effects of recent immigration to high skill occupations. This is done
in Table 2, which (for convenience) reports the coefficients obtained in the pre-
ferred specification of my OLS and IV regressions (see columns (3) in Tables
A.1 and A.4) and the total effect obtained by multiplying these coefficients by
the increase in the share of recent immigrants. It is evident that the workers at
the tails of the wage distribution experienced substantial wage changes, while
immigration only affected mean wages moderately.
Table 2 about here
I do not expect significant wage effects for low skill occupations since my
coefficients are close to zero and the share of recent immigrants in low skill
occupations has on average remained about constant (although there are con-
siderable differences between low skill occupation groups).
Again, these calculations have to be taken with a grain of salt since they
neglect immigration effects other than on gross hourly wages and since the
coefficients are estimated with some degree of imprecision. However, it is safe
to claim that immigration has substantial effects for subgroups of the labor force,
especially in high skill occupations, despite small effects on average wages and
on overall inequality. Specifically, workers who happen to work in occupations
that experience large immigrant inflows and who dispose of skills similar to those
of immigrants are substantially hurt by immigration, while those whose skill set
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is complementary to immigrant labor enjoy substantial gains from immigration.
7 Conclusion
Previous studies on the wage effects of immigration have searched for corre-
lations between immigrant density and the mean wage in subgroups of the
population. Since immigration, however, is likely to have different effects on
differently skilled residents, Dustmann et al. (2008b) shift the focus from mean
wages to the distribution of wages. I follow their lead and add to their insights. I
adapt their approach and employ it on a panel of occupation-experience groups
(rather than regions) to take the critique of the spatial correlations approach
into account. I even go a step further, not only reporting coefficients for dif-
ferent parts of the wage distribution but estimating the effect on overall wage
inequality. The subject of my study, Switzerland, is interesting for two reasons.
From an international point of view, it provides insights for a country where
immigrants are overrepresented not only at the bottom but also at the top of
the wage distribution. From a Swiss-oriented point of view it contributes to the
current political debate surrounding free movement of persons with the EU and
the EFTA.
I find that recent immigrants in Switzerland are overrepresented at the bot-
tom of the wage distribution in low skill occupations and at the top in high skill
occupations. Simple economic theory thus suggests that immigration has com-
pressed the wage distribution in high skill occupations and expanded it in low
skill occupations. My regression analysis confirms this hypothesis for high skill
occupations. This provides strong evidence for the notion that natives whose
skill set is similar to that of immigrants lose and natives with a complementary
skill set gain from immigration. In low skill occupations, however, I do not find
any effects of significant magnitude - although the estimations are rather precise.
This finding is likely to be driven by minimum wages anchored in universally
binding collective labor agreements and by a set of measures taken by the Swiss
authorities to prevent wage decreases in low skill occupations as a consequence
of the FMP [Flankierende Massnahmen].
All in all, these “wage change effects” of immigration imply a decrease in
overall inequality due to a compression of the wage distribution of natives and
earlier immigrants in high skill occupations. However, immigration also has an
“accounting effect” on inequality since the newly immigrated workers are also
part of the wage distribution. I show that the wage change effect is dominated
by the accounting effect of immigration, but also that both effects are rather
small in magnitude.
While the overall effects of immigration - both on inequality and on mean
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wages - seem negligible, there are substantial effects for subgroups of the pop-
ulation. Specifically, my OLS estimates imply that wages in research and de-
velopment - the occupation group that experienced the largest increase in im-
migrant density - have increased by 11.25 (natives) and 19.5 percent (earlier
immigrants), respectively, at the bottom of the wage distribution and decreased
by 4.35 (natives) and 12.75 percent (earlier immigrants), respectively, at the
top.
All of these findings have to be taken with a grain of salt. Firstly, most esti-
mates are subject to some degree of imprecision - in particular the IV estimates.
Secondly, my analysis is not a definitive verdict on the effects of immigration
but rather a piece of jigsaw. Namely, it is restricted to the effects of immi-
gration on wages, while immigration has effects on other economic variables as
well - above all on employment opportunities of residents, on taxes and social
security, and on costs of living. Nevertheless, it is an important contribution
to the understanding of the impact of immigration on the host society. Specif-
ically, it confirms the finding by Dustmann et al. (2008b) that pressure is felt
at those parts of the wage distribution, where immigrants are overrepresented,
in a country with bi-polar immigration. It reveals that while the effects of im-
migration on the overall wage distribution are small, they are of considerable
magnitude at the tails of the wage distribution. Contrary to common notion,
negative wage effects are more pronounced at the top of the distribution, while
low earners seem to be well protected by wage rigidities and legal measures.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Workers in Different Occupations
Occupation High
skill
Tertiary
edu-
ca-
tion
Hourly
wage
Labor
force
share
% % CHF %
High skill occupations
1. Definition of corporate strategy 68.5 68.4 71.34 3.0
2. Research and development 18.3 66.5 46.82 1.4
3. Evaluation, consultancy, certification 15.7 44.7 50.86 3.8
4. Planning, design, layout 12.3 48.7 39.02 3.5
5. Accounting and personnel 11.9 30.4 40.93 4.6
6. Analysis, programming, operating 11.2 48.5 45.83 2.3
7. Trade in goods 10.1 28.3 43.65 1.7
8. Logistics and staff duties 9.5 29.2 41.40 1.9
Low skill occupations
9. Education 6.9 56.9 49.26 1.7
10. Culture, information, and recreation 5.9 28.4 36.45 1.1
11. Medical, nursing and social functions 5.3 21.6 32.57 6.6
12. Other administrative functions 4.0 14.5 34.50 6.7
13. Restoration, crafts 3.9 8.2 27.43 0.2
14. Security, surveillance 3.9 6.8 31.69 0.3
15. Construction 3.3 8.4 30.41 7.6
16. Machinery 2.2 7.9 31.96 6.9
17. Retail sale of goods and services 1.8 6.3 25.92 9.6
18. Manufacturing, processing 1.8 4.9 28.14 16.3
19. Secretarial, office work 1.3 9.4 32.38 5.2
20. Hotel, catering trade, housework 1.2 4.7 22.62 7.6
21. Transport and communications 1.2 3.0 28.60 4.8
22. Personal hygiene, dress care 1.0 4.4 20.91 0.6
23. Cleaning and public hygiene 0.2 1.3 22.46 2.6
Notes: The sample includes workers aged 18-65 and employed in the private sector (residents
as well as border commuters). All cross-sections from 1994 to 2008 are pooled. Cross-
sectional weights are adjusted so that every cross-section has the same total weight. The
wage refers to gross hourly earnings in real Swiss Francs (base year is 2000). For definitions
of skill and education see the main text. Source: LSE, BFS.
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Table 2: Estimated Wage Effects of Immigration in Research and Development
OLS IV
Coefficient Total effect Coefficient Total effect
(%) (%)
Natives
5th percentile 0.015 11.25 0.018 13.5
Mean −0.001 −0.75 −0.0014 −1
95th percentile −0.0058 −4.35 −0.012 −9
Earlier immigrants
5th percentile 0.026 19.5 0.064 48
Mean −0.0016 −1.2 −0.0078 −5.85
95th percentile −0.017 −12.75 −0.014 −10.5
Notes: The coefficients are the results from the preferred specification of my OLS and
IV regressions (columns (3) in Tables A.1 and A.4). The total effects are calculated by
multiplying the respective coefficient by the increase of 7.5 percentage points in the share
of recent immigrants in research and development, which is the largest increase for any
occupation group. Source: LSE, BFS.
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Figure 1: Education Levels of Recent Immigrants in Switzerland
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Notes: The sample includes all workers aged 18-65 and employed in the private sector.
"High educated" refers to workers with a tertiary education, "low educated" to workers who
have completed no more than the mandatory part of education. "Natives" are Swiss citi-
zens, "earlier immigrants" workers with a permanent residency permit, "recent immigrants"
individuals with a temporary residency permit. For details on these definitions Section 4.
Source: LSE, BFS.
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Figure 2: Position of Recent Immigrants in the Wage Distribution of Natives
and Earlier Immigrants
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile of native wage distribution
 Recent immigrants 
 Natives 
kernel = gaussian, degree = 0, bandwidth = 1.4
(a) Natives, High Skill Occupations
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
.
02
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile of wage distribution of earlier immigrants
 Recent immigrants 
 Earlier immigrants 
kernel = gaussian, degree = 0, bandwidth = 1.95
(b) Earlier Immigrants, High Skill
Occupations
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile of native wage distribution
 Recent immigrants 
 Natives 
kernel = gaussian, degree = 0, bandwidth = 1.49
(c) Natives, Low Skill Occupations
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile of wage distribution of earlier immigrants
 Recent immigrants 
 Earlier immigrants 
kernel = gaussian, degree = 0, bandwidth = 1.29
(d) Earlier Immigrants, Low Skill
Occupations
Notes: The abscissa indicates the percentile of the wage distribution of natives or earlier
immigrants, the ordinate measures probability density. The distribution of natives and
earlier immigrants across wage percentiles of natives and earlier immigrants, respectively,
is illustrated by the dashed line. The Kernel density estimates of the distribution of recent
immigrants are illustrated by the solid line. Source: LSE, BFS.
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Figure 3: OLS Estimates for the Effect of Immigration on the Wages of Natives
and Earlier Immigrants
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Notes: The figure illustrates the OLS regression results of my preferred specification. The
abscissa indicates the percentile of the wage distribution of natives or earlier immigrants,
the ordinate measures the respective coefficient. Dependent variable is the change in the
log of wage percentiles. Independent variable is the lag of the change in the share of recent
immigrants. Time fixed effects and population controls are included. The regressions include
all cross-sections from 1994-2008. Occupation-experience groups are weighted by numbers of
observations. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the level of occupation-experience
groups. Source: LSE, BFS.
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Figure 4: IV Estimates for the Effect of Immigration on the Wages of Natives
and Earlier Immigrants
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Notes: The figure illustrates the IV regression results of my preferred specification. The
abscissa indicates the percentile of the wage distribution of natives or earlier immigrants,
the ordinate measures the respective coefficient. Dependent variable is the change in the
log of wage percentiles. Independent variable is the lag of the change in the share of recent
immigrants. IV is the change in the share of recent immigrants as predicted based on the
distribution of immigrants across occupations as of 1994. Time fixed effects and population
controls are included. The regressions include all cross-sections from 1994-2008. Occupation-
experience groups are weighted by numbers of observations. Standard errors are robust and
clustered on the level of occupation-experience groups. Source: LSE, BFS.
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Figure 5: Effects of Immigration on Overall Inequality
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Notes: Panel (a) depicts the Lorenz curves for the actual Swiss labor force (total poupla-
tion), the labor force without recent immigrants (natives and earlier immigrants, actual),
and the labor force without recent immigrants and without the estimated wage effect of
recent immmigration (natives and earlier immigrants, counterfacutal). Panel (b) illustrates
the differences between these Lorenz curves. The difference between the actual and the
counterfactual curve for natives and earlier immigrants is termed the "economic effect".
The difference between the curve for total population and the counterfactual curve for na-
tives and earlier immigrants is termed the "total effect". Source: LSE, BFS.
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Table A.6: Changes in the Density of Recent Immigrants, 1994-2008
Occupation Change in density of
recent immigrants
(pp)
High skill occupations
Research and development 7.5
Evaluation, consultancy, certification 5.6
Analysis, programming, operating 4.7
Planning, design, layout 4.4
Trade in goods 3.9
Logistics and staff duties 3.6
Accounting and personnel 3.1
Definition of corporate strategy 2.3
Low skill occupations
Cleaning and public hygiene 6.9
Personal hygiene, dress care 3.6
Other administrative functions 3.4
Secretarial, office work 3.0
Culture, information, and recreation 2.8
Security, surveillance 2.7
Education 2.6
Retail sale of goods and services 1.7
Transport and communications 1.2
Manufacturing, processing 1.0
Machinery 0.1
Medical, nursing and social functions -0.5
Hotel, catering trade, housework -4.9
Construction -6.2
Restoration, crafts -8.5
Notes: The sample includes workers aged 18-65 and employed in the private sector (residents
as well as border commuters).Source: LSE, BFS.
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